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Any reader of the paper by Laloux et al. [1] would have been left utterly confused after consulting the time
series for the price of Japanese Government Bonds (JGB) around May 1995 looking for a log-periodic power law
acceleration in the data. The authors of [1] now confess their error and admit that the prediction date given in [1] was
incorrect and that the correct prediction was for August 1995. However, they now report [2] that the analysis leading
to the prediction was made in May 1995. Obviously, this is also incorrect since the data used in the analysis, see fig. 1
of [3], does not start before June 1995. That the authors of the reply (LMAB) have severe problems regarding dating
certain events becomes even clearer reading the second section of the reply. Reference [3] of the reply (corresponding
to reference [5]) is essentially a 19 page answer to the criticism put forward in [4]. Nevertheless, LMAB writes that I
and Didier Sornette (JS) ignores the work of J.A. Feigenbaum!
Let us now turn away from the prediction experiment in question as well as the issue of whom cites whom and
address the physical issues raised by LMAB. That crashes occurs for a number of different reasons and unfolds in
various ways is quite obvious. For example, the bond crash of October 1998 mentioned by LMAB is generally
explained as a result of the heavy investments made by German Banks in Russia. When the Rubel crashed, so did the
Bundes bond. Other crashes triggered by external events are the ones on Wall Street in 1973 (OPEC oil embargo) and
1974 (Nixon’s resignation). However, no consensus regarding the origin of the world-wide crash of 1987 exists. This
clearly illustrates that crashes occurs for a variety of reasons of which speculative bubbles are just one. What we (JS)
has argued in a number of papers [5, 6] is that speculative bubbles on the financial markets are more often than not
quantifiable by a log-periodic power law acceleration ending in a crash or a large correction. That the crash/correction
is not certain was already made clear in 1998 [7] where a probabilistic framework was developed. I wish to stress
that such a probabilistic framework is essential in order for our hypothesis to make sense. In the same paper, an
explanation to why that the time of the crash/correction predicted by the governing log-periodic power law eq. in
general over-shoots the actual date was also offered.
With respect to the work on the distribution of price changes and the possible existence of outliers, my own work
with D. Sornette has been done using drawdowns on daily data whereas the work by V. Plerou et al. and J.-F. Muzy et
al. mentioned by LMAB was done using returns on time series containing intra-day data. A comparison of results is
therefore very difficult, since returns are calculated over a fixed time horizon whereas drawdowns uses a flexible time
horizon adapted to the market dynamics [6]. What D. Sornette and I have argued is that drawdowns is a more natural
and relevant measure of e.g. stock market fluctuations than returns on an arbitrary fixed time scale.
Last, a few minor points should be addressed. First, using the same statistics for the drawups as for the drawdown
the largest drawup shown in fig. 1 of [3] is 4.2%. Hence, there are no “drawup outlier” in the data shown. Second, the
remark of LMAB that “put options are worth nothing if the contract is above the exercise price” is only true on the
maturity date itself. Considering the nature of option trading it is quite extraordinary that no money was lost. In fact,
this was one of the reasons why the experiment was considered a partial success at that time [8]. This was certainly
due to the fact that the price was declining unusually fast even though the JGB did not crash in a conventionally sense.
Last I consider it quite strange that one of the authors of [1] (R. Cont) is silent about my comment.
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